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Paternalist Deception in the Lotus Sūtra:
A Normative Assessment
Charles A. Goodman1

Abstract
The Lotus Sūtra repeatedly asserts the moral permissibility, in certain circumstances, of deceiving others for their own benefit.
The examples it uses to illustrate this view have the features of
weak paternalism, but the real-world applications it endorses
would today be considered strong paternalism. We can explain
this puzzling feature of the text by noting that according to
Mahāyāna Buddhists, normal, ordinary people are so irrational
that they are relevantly similar to the insane. Kant’s determined
anti-paternalism, by contrast, relies on an obligation to see others as rational, which can be read in several ways. Recent work in
psychology provides support for the Lotus Sūtra’s philosophical
anthropology while undermining the plausibility of Kant’s version. But this result does not necessarily lead to an endorsement
of political paternalism, since politicians are not qualified to
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wield such power. Some spiritual teachers, however, may be morally permitted to benefit their students by deceiving them.

Autonomy, Paternalism, and Appropriate Means
The Lotus Sūtra has had a profound influence on the lives of hundreds of
millions of people, mainly in East Asia. Although many have turned to it
for advice about how to live, and although it does contain ethical guidance, the Lotus Sūtra is not primarily a work of ethics. But we do find in
the text, repeated over and over again, a particular kind of moral view; a
view, in fact, that is potentially both troubling and controversial. Numerous passages in the Lotus Sūtra present us with wise, compassionate
figures who assist others by lying to them, or at least, making misleading
statements to them. Some ethicists in the Western tradition, most notably Immanuel Kant, would deny the moral permissibility of this way of
helping others. Could spiritual teachers such as the Buddha be justified
in using deception to promote the happiness and spiritual growth of
their students? Or is there a moral error at the heart of the Lotus Sūtra?
There is already a rich tradition of scholarly inquiry into the Lotus
Sūtra. Therefore, in investigating the question of paternalist deception in
that text, I do not need to start from scratch. Damien Keown and Gene
Reeves, among other scholars, have already explored these issues; I shall
summarize a few of their conclusions. The benevolent lies discussed in
the Lotus Sūtra are classified under the important Buddhist concept of
upāya. The most common translation of this term is “skillful means,” but
Gene Reeves suggests it should be rendered as “appropriate means” (Appropriate 382). Doctrinally, the concept of appropriate means is repeatedly used to account for the existence of the Way of the Disciples (Skt.
śrāvaka-yāna) as one authentic form of the Buddha’s religion, and to explain the differences between that teaching and the Mahāyāna.
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From a Western point of view, the benevolent lies in question
would evidently count as paternalism. This is deceptive, rather than
coercive, paternalism: the Lotus Sūtra never explicitly endorses paternalist uses of physical force, and at one point seems to reject them. 2 Moreover, as Keown points out, in most of the parables, the characters in the
stories who benefit from being deceived are not fully rational: they are
children, or mentally disturbed, or tired and distressed, and so on (373).
So if we focus on these stories, what the Lotus Sūtra endorses would
count as weak paternalism, which is the use of coercion or deception to
get people who are for whatever reason not fully rational to do or allow
what would be in their best interests. Weak paternalism is not nearly as
controversial as strong paternalism, in which coercive or deceptive
means are employed on normal, adult humans whose rationality is not
impaired by any unusual conditions. But if we bring our attention to the
doctrinal applications of the parables in question, the people who are
being deceived are normal adults, including many of the Buddha’s own
Disciples. So although the parables themselves are examples of weak paternalism, they are being used to support a view that, by ordinary standards, appears to count as strong paternalism.
Having implicitly recognized this point, Keown decides not to
wrestle with the issues it raises, writing:
How accurately these parables reflect the underlying truth of the
situation they purport to represent is, of course, quite another
topic. Whether the Buddha’s early followers can really be likened
to deluded children or not is debatable, but it is not a question I
can enter into here. (373)
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At Reeves Classic 143, a father attempts to use coercion on his mentally unstable amnesiac son. The attempt fails: the son is utterly terrified and falls into a faint. The father
then decides to resort to paternalist deception instead; he pretends to need stable
workers and offers his son a job removing dung.
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I propose to begin where Keown left off, and to consider a question
closely related to the one he chooses not to answer. If we care about
whether the ethical perspective of the Lotus Sūtra is substantively defensible, this is undoubtedly what we will have to do. But I shall not consider Keown’s exact question, because I think it frames the issue in an
unfortunate way. Those practicing the Way of the Disciples are not the
only ones who may receive misleading teachings from the Buddha. Consider a beginning bodhisattva who forms the aspiration “I will become a
Buddha,” an aspiration without which one cannot really enter the
Mahāyāna. But since there is no self, there is no “I” even now, much less
a persisting self that will exist until the time of Buddhahood. Moreover,
as Peggy Morgan points out, the Lotus Sūtra’s account of its own composition and historical setting, in a cosmic assembly of humans and nonhumans on Vulture Peak in the time of Śākyamuni, is literally, historically false and therefore, at best, itself an example of appropriate means
(353-56). This account, of course, is addressed to any and all readers of
the Sūtra. In order for the ethical perspective of the Lotus Sūtra to be defensible, it will have to turn out that all of us who are not fully awake are
appropriate objects of paternalistic deception.
In order to explore whether that claim can be made good, it will
help to examine the arguments that can be offered against paternalism.
Now if we are looking for an ethical theory that is staunchly opposed to
benevolent lying, we will find it in the writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant
notoriously claimed that it would be wrong to lie to a murderer who demands information about the location of his intended victim; when he
was taken to task for this claim by Benjamin Constant and others, he
emphatically reasserted and defended it in a piece entitled “On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns” (Ellington 63-67).
Kant has several main types of arguments available for rejecting
the idea of benevolent lying; I will discuss one based on the first and
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three based on the second formulations of the Categorical Imperative.
The first type of argument is related to the Formula of Universal Law.
Kant argues that the moral principle that forbids lying is universal, a priori, exceptionless, and holds in all cases whatsoever, no matter how disastrous the consequences of following it might be.3 The other arguments
are related to the Formula of Humanity. Kant can say that we have an
obligation to respect the humanity of others, and that this obligation
must be honored even at great cost. If we deceive others with the intention of benefiting them, we show disrespect for their rational nature and
thus wrong them, even if the results turn out to be helpful.
Gene Reeves has helpfully pointed out how different the ethics of
the Lotus Sūtra is from Kant’s system of immutable, universal laws:
[T]he Buddha provides four sets of prescriptions which bodhisattvas should follow … But these should be understood, I think,
not as commandments but more like counsel or rules of thumb.
Principles, at least in the strongest sense, are eternal, God-given,
or at least implanted permanently in the nature of things. The
hōben of the Lotus Sūtra, in contrast, are provisional. Once used,
they may no longer be useful, precisely because they were appropriate for some concrete situation. (Appropriate 387)
This kind of moral framework shouldn’t really be described as relativist,
since philosophers typically use the term “relativism” to refer to a
theory in which whatever a particular individual or culture believes
about ethics is automatically right for them. Instead, it would make more
3

This is in fact the main tack he takes in his essay “On a Supposed Right ...” For example, he says: “But here one must understand the danger not as that of (accidentally)
doing harm [schaden] but in general as the danger of doing wrong [unrecht]. And such
wrongdoing would occur if I made the duty of truthfulness, which is wholly unconditional and which constitutes the supreme juridical condition in assertions, into a conditional duty subordinate to other considerations. And although by telling a certain lie I
in fact do not wrong anyone, I nevertheless violate the principle of right in regard to all
unavoidably necessary statements generally” (Ellington 67).
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sense to think of the framework as consequentialist; what makes the
Buddha’s means appropriate is that they work, that they actually succeed in benefiting sentient beings.4
How credible is Kant’s first line of argument? Many philosophers
today would agree that Kant’s main attempt to justify his own favored
set of immutable principles, namely, the Formula of Universal Law, is a
failure. The set of wrong actions, and the set of actions such that they
wouldn’t work if everyone did them, may overlap, but they pretty clearly
don’t coincide.5 And Sidgwick’s brilliant and searching examination of
the “Morality of Common Sense” at the end of the nineteenth century
should already have convinced us that we can’t expect to extract a set of
mutually consistent, exceptionless moral principles from the messy
moral practices of our society (Book III).
So Kant’s most promising strategies for rejecting the appropriateness of benevolent deception rely on a commitment never to treat
humanity as a mere means, but always at the same time as an end. Now
this kind of moral reasoning relies on a particular kind of philosophical
anthropology, an account of human nature and of the self. For Kant, everything in the human personality that can be studied empirically is subject to, and determined by, causation. However, Kant asserts that there
is, in addition to these determined phenomena, something else, a noumenal self, which is outside space and time. The noumenal self is fully
and perfectly rational. When it chooses, it always chooses a morally
permissible action. It is not possible for us to know, through the exercise
of theoretical reason, that this noumenal self exists. But the noumenal
4

See Reeves Appropriate 382. Reeves does not see the ethics of the Lotus Sūtra as exclusively consequentialist, since intentions matter too. But in Goodman 186-87, I show
how to deal with this problem by moving to a subjective version of consequentialism.
This kind of consequentialist theory can easily accommodate the role of intention in
Buddhist ethics.
5

As in the powerful example, “I will buy a toy train, but never sell one.”
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self can be an object of belief, or faith (Ger. Glaube.) Belief in the noumenal self is necessary, according to Kant, in order to make the moral
life possible.
How should we regard the ascription of a rational noumenal self
to all humans? After all, Kant does not want to deny that people sometimes act irrationally. We do so whenever we do something wrong. So
what is he asserting when he ascribes a perfectly rational nature to all of
us, and tells us that morality requires us to respect it? We could see this
rational nature as a mere capacity, as a conclusive presumption based on
our ignorance, or as an ideal of reason. Let’s explore what each of these
alternatives would involve.
One Kantian strategy would be to argue that the capacity for full
rationality needs to be respected even in those people who rarely or
never exercise it. So even in a case where we might know that the person
in question will definitely do something irrational that will lead to misery, we still should not intervene deceptively or coercively to stop that
person, out of respect for their capacity for rationality.
It strikes me that we will find this version of the argument from
the Formula of Humanity plausible only if we have already been convinced that humanity, the capacity to set ends and think rationally about
how to attain them, has unconditional moral value, whereas happiness
does not. It is only by severely downgrading our understanding of the
value of this person’s happiness that we can see an intervention to protect it as wrong in virtue of infringing on a capacity that we know will
not be exercised. Now Kant has a powerful argument for this understanding of moral value: the Regress to Humanity as an End. But although this argument has been persuasive to many, it can reasonably be
rejected. In particular, Buddhists can and should reject Kant’s argument.
I make this case in my book, Consequences of Compassion (198-200), and I
will not repeat it here.
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But can we in fact have the kind of knowledge I have been assuming? Although Kant admits that people do make irrational choices, he
also argues for severe limits to our ability to know the status of an action
as rational or irrational. No one, not even the agent, can know for sure
that an action was rational and free, since it may secretly have been
done out of immoral motives. Moreover, although we might be able to
know that someone else’s action was morally wrong, we can’t know what
that other person takes her happiness to consist in, so we can’t know
whether an action that strikes us as merely imprudent was actually rational or not.6 If it is impossible to know this information, then it makes
sense that we would be obligated, in our relations with others, to conclusively presume that they are acting rationally, since we cannot know
otherwise. And in this case, the generally accepted existence of human
irrationality can offer no support to a paternalist action or policy. Instead, we are bound to respect the rationality and autonomy of others
and allow them to make their own decisions. We may never try to manipulate their rationality with lies, especially for some alleged benefit to
them, since this would be inconsistent with the dignity belonging to the
free human nature which is always able to manifest in them. Paternalistic deception would mean that you are trying to control others for what
you think is their good, instead of allowing them to express their own
autonomy by freely choosing in the context of knowing the truth. But
according to Kant, respecting their autonomy is precisely what morality
requires, both in general and in this kind of case.
Finally, we could propose that we regard the ascription of rationality to others as an “ideal of reason.” What would this involve? This
way of working out Kant’s argument is developed by Christine Korsgaard
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Kant’s complex views about what we can and cannot know about the motivation and
moral worth of actions are scattered across a number of places in his writings. See, for
example, Infield 230.
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in her essay “Two Arguments Against Lying.”7 Freedom and rationality
are not properties whose presence or absence can be known through
empirical evidence or a priori theoretical reasoning: as Korsgaard writes,
“Actual conduct, then, does not provide evidence for or against freedom” (352). Instead, there is a practical and moral requirement to ascribe freedom and rationality to ourselves and others. Theoretical
evidence can give us some guidance about which entities this requirement might apply to: we are unlikely to face a moral requirement to
treat rocks as free and autonomous beings, for example. But in applying
concepts of freedom to adolescents or to the mentally ill, there are inescapable cases of practical judgment that cannot be settled by any theoretical considerations: “We must decide who to count as a free rational
being” (356). Moreover, according to Korsgaard, “The pressure of the
moral law is towards treating every human being as a free rational being,
regardless of actual facts” (352). Paternalist lies directed at normal adult
humans would push directly against this moral pressure. On this interpretation of Kant’s argument, in the absence of theoretical knowledge,
we must make a choice; but certain choices, such as treating normal
adults as appropriate objects of paternalist deception, are ruled out by
the respect we owe to others.
What kind of account could Mahāyāna Buddhists, such as the
people who composed the Lotus Sūtra, offer as an alternative to Kant’s
view? We could start, of course, with the doctrine of no self. Buddhists
claim that we have a powerful, innate, largely subconscious commitment
to the view that each of us exists as a real thing (Skt. dravyasat.) But this
view is a mistake. Special, trans-empirical entities such as the soul or the
noumenal self are utterly nonexistent fabrications, made up to enable
philosophers to offer spurious justifications for this innate mistake. The
individual person exists as a mere conceptual construction out of more
7

The argument in Korsgaard is complex and subtle; I hope I do it justice here.
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basic materials. These more basic materials may themselves, in turn, be
the products of conceptual construction. On the view of the Abhidharma
traditions, the process of reduction will eventually terminate in a collection of absolutely simple mental and physical phenomena. But according
to the Madhyamaka view, we will never find anything that is not conceptually constructed. When we indicate, point out, think about, or refer to
things, we can never avoid using categories that are created by our
minds; and none of the entities we relate to or interact with can exist
apart from these categories. Above all, our own existence has this same
status: we do not exist as real, objective entities; we people exist only
from a certain point of view.
The doctrine of no self has, alone, few implications relevant to
our question. These implications emerge only when we conjoin it with a
Buddhist analysis of the emotions. A number of Indian Buddhist texts
present or presuppose a cognitivist view of emotions, closely analogous
to that of the ancient Stoics. On this kind of view, emotions are not seen
as non-representational, mute drives or urges; they are caused by, and
saturated with, representational judgments. In the case of reactive emotions (Skt. kleśa) such as hatred, greed, desire, competitiveness, and
pride, which dominate the minds of ordinary beings in cyclic existence,
these judgments are comprehensively false. This view of the nature of
emotions can be documented in several important Mahāyāna sources. In
the Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti, for example, the title character says: “Reverend Upāli, passions consist of conceptualizations” (Thurman 31). A
number of passages that do not directly support cognitivism nevertheless indicate that reactive emotions are caused by false judgments.
Vimalakīrti says that sickness “arises from the passions that result from
unreal mental constructions” (Thurman 45). In Ārya Śūra’s Garland of
Birth Stories (Jātaka-mālā), similarly, we read: “Just as fire consumes the
stick that kindles it, so anger destroys the man whose false notions give
rise to it” (Khoroche 138).

11
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Once they have arisen from mistaken conceptual judgments,
reactive emotions then proceed to make the original problem worse by
deluding and confusing us. This is why Śāntideva, in the Introduction to
the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life, says that anger is a “deceiver” (Crosby and
Skilton 50). Ārya Śūra explains this view eloquently, again in relation to
anger:
He whose presence makes one blind, whose absence makes one
clear-sighted—he stirred within me but did not escape me: Anger,
I mean, who injures the man who harbors him … Anger makes
him oblivious of the path to success lying open before him; instead, he stays away from it and so is deprived of fame and success … Usually he turns stupidly quarrelsome and too dull-witted
to discern what is good for him and what bad. (Khoroche 137-8)
Although anger is particularly destructive in this regard, it’s important
to stress that the other reactive emotions are deceivers too. Desire, for
example, often makes us overestimate just how good it would be for us
to get the thing we want. Given that ordinary people spend most of their
time oscillating from one reactive emotion to another, it follows that
they spend most of their time being deceived by their own irrational patterns. This claim helps us understand the nature of the dream in which
most of us live. Much of what we relate to, think about and care about
consists of unreal projections created by our irrational thoughts and
emotions. To see the world as it is, free from these projections, is a major
component of what it is to be awake (Skt. Buddha.)
On Kant’s view of ethics, no profound theoretical knowledge or
spiritual insight is required to do the right thing. Absolutely everyone is
able to know what is right and what is wrong, even in difficult cases, although most cannot articulate this knowledge as a universal principle.8
8

Ellington 15-16: “Thus within the moral cognition of ordinary human reason we have
arrived at its principle. To be sure, such reason does not think of this principle abstract-

Goodman, Paternalist Deception in the Lotus Sūtra

12

By contrast, the Lotus Sūtra, along with other Mahāyāna Sūtras, describes
humans as deeply confused, misunderstanding the world around them in
ways that make it impossible for them to see the moral status and consequences of their actions clearly. Thus the Sūtra of Innumerable Meanings,
considered part of the threefold Lotus Sūtra, tells us:
All living beings, however, make delusory distinctions: weighing
whether something is this or that; whether it is a gain or a loss.
Bad thoughts come to them, producing a variety of evil actions.
They transmigrate within the six states undergoing all kinds of
suffering and harm, from which they cannot escape during innumerable billions of eons. (Reeves Classic 34)
From a Buddhist point of view, then, ordinary people are very
closely analogous to the insane: “The world is a confusion of insane
people striving to delude themselves” (Crosby and Skilton 94). Common
sense tells us that a therapist dealing with a gravely mentally ill patient
would be perfectly justified in going along with some aspects of the patient’s delusional structure if doing so would make it possible for the patient to be more comfortable, less distressed, or less dangerous. This
would be a clear case of weak paternalism, and we would see it as morally acceptable. But if the real truth is that we, the normal humans, are all
crazy, then the same framework applies to us. Similar analogies could be
drawn to the permissible treatment of the profoundly retarded, and, of
course, of small children. This account allows us to make perfect sense of
the way in which the Lotus Sūtra uses analogies that sound like weak paly in its universal form, but does always have it actually in view and does use it as the
standard of judgment. It would here be easy to show how ordinary reason, with this
compass in hand, is well able to distinguish, in every case that occurs, what is good or
evil, in accordance with duty, or contrary to duty, if we do not in the least try to teach
reason anything new but only make it attend, as Socrates did, to its own principle—and
thereby do we show that neither science nor philosophy is needed in order to know
what one must do to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous. Indeed we might
even have conjectured beforehand that cognizance of what every man is obligated to
do, and hence also to know, would be available to every man, even the most ordinary.”

13

Journal of Buddhist Ethics

ternalism to justify ethical prescriptions that would normally be seen as
strong paternalism. On the Mahāyāna Buddhist view, the basic assumption of the distinction between the weak and strong versions of paternalism is a mistake: ordinary adult humans are not particularly rational. So
what would look to most people like strong paternalism—namely, the
use of deception on normal adults for their benefit—actually counts as
weak paternalism, and as a result, will be easier to justify than we might
have thought. As practiced by the Buddhas, paternalistic deception is an
appropriate response to the profound delusions built into the mindset
that creates the human realm.
Evaluating the Models
Between these two theoretical models—of humans as free, rational, autonomous, dignified moral agents who must be given the chance to make
their own decisions with full information, and of ordinary people as confused, immature, irrational, struggling beings who can appropriately be
deceived for their own good—which is more true to the way things are?
Recent developments in psychology and related sciences have dealt severe blows to the Kantian framework and provided strong support to the
views of the Lotus Sūtra. The social sciences have long been dominated by
methodological rationalism, the project of understanding society on the
assumption that people are rational in their decision-making. But today,
methodological rationalism is in full retreat, routed by the experimental
findings of behavioral economics and dismayed by the manifest wreckage of a financial system devastated by irrational choices.
One simple example of predictable human irrationality comes
from an experiment designed by two professors of business at MIT, who
set up an auction for Boston Celtics tickets. As Jonah Lehrer explains,
Half the participants in the auction were informed that they had
to pay with cash; the other half were told they had to pay with
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credit cards. [The experimenters] then averaged the bids for the
two different groups. Lo and behold, the average credit card bid
was twice as high as the average cash bid. When people used
their Visas and MasterCards, their bids were much more reckless.
(Lehrer 86)
This kind of experiment can go far towards explaining why, in the decade leading up to the present crisis, Americans have been borrowing
more than they are saving and spending more than they can afford. Of
course, there is no rationally justifiable explanation for the difference;
the only possible explanation relies on the psychological unpleasantness
the subjects experienced in actually parting with cash, as compared to
how psychologically easy it is simply to charge a purchase.
Experiments by Dan Ariely have confirmed the existence of a
striking phenomenon known as “arbitrary coherence.” Ariely offered
business students a list of five goods, including electronics, chocolates,
and bottles of wine. He asked them to write down the last two digits of
their social security numbers, expressed as dollar amounts, and then indicate whether they would be willing to pay that sum for each of the
goods. He then held a sealed-bid auction, with real money, for each of
these products. Astonishingly, the amounts that the students bid for the
items were strongly correlated with the last two digits of their social security numbers. The effect was dramatic:
The top 20 percent, for instance, bid an average of $56 for the
cordless keyboard; the bottom 20 percent bid an average of $16.
In the end, we could see that students with social security numbers ending in the upper 20 percent placed bids that were 216 to
346 percent higher than those of the students with social security
numbers ending in the lowest 20 percent. (Ariely 28)

15
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The students in this experiment were not totally lacking in economic logic. As Ariely writes,
When we looked at the bids for the two pairs of related items (the
two wines and the two computer components), their relative prices seemed incredibly logical. Everyone was willing to pay more for
the keyboard than for the trackball—and also pay more for the
1996 Hermitage than for the 1998 Côtes du Rhône (Ariely 29).
However, the absolute amounts the students were willing to bid were
profoundly influenced by an utterly irrelevant and non-rational factor:
the random influence of their social security numbers. This experiment
helps to illuminate both the enduring strengths and the long-overlooked
limitations of economic theories based on methodological rationalism. It
should also cast serious doubt on the idea that, when we are not acting
wrongly, we make choices out of an intelligible faculty of practical reason.
Some empirical psychological evidence of irrationality helps to
confirm the Buddhist view that reactive emotions, such as anger, cause
us to have distorted and inaccurate beliefs. As one review article explains,
[A]nger elicits a kind of “defensive optimism,” in which angry
people systematically de-emphasize the importance and potential impact on the self of the negative events (Hemenover &
Zhang, 2004.) Finally, these effects appear even when angry subjects rate the likelihood of events for which anger is a predisposing factor. That is, even though chronically angry people are
more likely to have cardiovascular problems (Fredrickson et al.,
2000; Williams et al., 2000), experience divorce, and have difficulty at work (Caspi, Elder, & Bem, 1987), angry people rate themselves as significantly less likely than the average person to
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experience these problems (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). (Lerner
and Tiedens 124)
Thus Śāntideva was right to think of anger as a deceiver.
One striking experiment offers further support for Buddhist
claims about the irrational and counterproductive nature of anger and
the desire for revenge. Carlsmith, Wilson, and Gilbert created an experiment in which undergraduate students who had just concluded a standard public goods-type prisoners’ dilemma interaction were given the
opportunity to spend some of their money to punish a participant who
had urged them all to cooperate and who then herself defected. This participant was actually a computer, but the experimental subjects thought
they were punishing another student who had cheated them. Some students were asked to predict how they would feel if given the opportunity
to punish the free rider. Others went through the prisoners’ dilemma
trial but were not given the opportunity to engage in punishment.
Those subjects given the opportunity to predict their feelings
stated that getting the chance to inflict punishment on the free rider
would make them feel better. The students who were allowed to inflict
the punishment reported that they would have felt worse had they not
gotten the opportunity to punish. Both of these beliefs, however, were
false. In fact, those students who were able to inflict punishment and did
so were less happy than those who were not given the opportunity to
punish. The experimenters concluded that this worsened affect was due
at least in part to the fact that those who punished spent significantly
more time thinking about the free rider’s behavior (Carlsmith et al., 1320
and passim). This experiment gives us a clear example of a certain kind of
emotion causing us to have a false belief. It also constitutes a plausible
case of irrationality, since almost everyone has had the opportunity to
punish others in large or small ways in the past, and yet the belief this
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experiment exposed as false, namely that punishment leads to catharsis
and thus to feeling better, persists in numerous human cultures.
These examples are in no way atypical. They could be multiplied
at great length. Much of the work of experimental psychology over
many decades has been devoted to finding forms of irrational behavior
in humans. Each of them separately casts doubt on our self-image as rational choosers. Together, they render that self-image fundamentally
untenable.
Just how does this experimental evidence bear on the two competing pictures of philosophical anthropology sketched earlier? It should
be emphasized that the mere fact that people are sometimes irrational
does not in any way contradict Kant’s view. The problems for Kant arise
from the claim that people are sometimes predictably irrational. If there
are empirically discoverable, statistically robust patterns of irrationality
that people in general tend to exhibit, then we can sometimes be in a
position to know—not with certainty, but with the degree of reasonable
confidence that is all we can ever expect in practical matters—that
someone has been, is being, or will be irrational in making a certain decision. If this kind of knowledge is ever available to us, then the “conclusive presumption based on ignorance” argument cannot be successful.
What effect does this evidence have on the “ideal of reason” form
of the Kantian view? Perhaps we find in Kant a conception of rationality
so strong that no theoretical evidence could ever be sufficient to establish its presence. But to justify paternalist deception, the presence of this
robust kind of rationality is not what we need to establish: we need its
absence. And when an experimental subject is prone to arbitrary coherence, that subject is not being rational, either in a Kantian or any other
sense. The experiments described above make it possible to know in advance that a certain group of people will not respond to a situation rationally; so theoretical reason can establish the premise that paternalist
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deception needs to draw on. Of course, even if they will react irrationally
and we know this, they might still retain the mere capacity for Kantian
freedom; but if we have rejected the Regress to Humanity as an End,
there is insufficient motivation for regarding respect for this capacity as
so morally important as to override what we can know about these
people’s interests and the potential imminent threats to them. I conclude that none of the Kantian strategies I have considered are successful in defending an unqualified rejection of paternalistic deception.
The psychology experiments I have mentioned threaten not only
Kant’s critique of benevolent deception, but also his broader views about
the self and about how human thinking works. They push us away from a
picture of a perfect rationality arising from a mysterious noumenal
realm, and toward a picture of humans managing to cope with the world
around us through a wide variety of evolved heuristics, tricks, and
kludges. This is the view of rationality developed by Dennett in his classic book Elbow Room. For Dennett, rational thinking arose through an unplanned, unguided process of natural selection, and it is implemented in
an imperfect, buggy but immensely flexible and powerful physical machine, the brain. According to Dennett,
The perfect Kantian will, which would be able to respond with
perfect fidelity to all good reasons, is a physical impossibility;
neither determinism nor indeterminism could accommodate it …
We are not infinitely but only extraordinarily sensitive and versatile considerers of reasons. (49)
We might question whether full awakening (Skt. bodhi) will be possible in
this picture. It may well be that both karma and the possibility of awakening are a result of neuroplasticity, of the adaptability of the physical
basis of our minds. But until we awaken, those who understand the limitations of our rationality may sometimes be in a position to manipulate
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us deceptively for our own good; and if we understand the kind of beings
we are, there are strong reasons to think that we should not object.
The Catch
Should we, then, happily ride off into the sunrise of a paternalistic utopia, in which our spiritual and political leaders regularly deceive and
coerce us for our own benefit? If we are disturbed, or indeed frightened,
by such a prospect, we should not try to rehabilitate Kant’s philosophical
anthropology; there really is nothing about us that should rule us out
absolutely as objects of benevolent deception. Yet there is a severe problem with endorsing paternalism in practice. Paternalism is rightly exercised by adults over children; surely we cannot accept the idea that
eight-year-olds could use paternalistic deception or coercion on other
eight-year-olds. But if we are confused children, we may wonder whether the politicians and spiritual teachers we actually have are mature
enough to function as our parents.
When we turn our attention to politics, it is blindingly clear that
the answer is no. Just reflect for a moment on the American federal legislature, the Congress. While running for election to Congress, politicians
attempt to tell the voters whatever they may want to hear. Ordinary citizens, in turn, typically cast their votes on the basis of racial or religious
group membership, non-rational forms of identity, physical appearance,
or inaccurate beliefs fostered by misleading television advertisements.
Even if they make a sincere effort to choose in an informed and reasonable way, citizens in the voting booth are subject to the very same forms
of irrationality and bias that plague them in their individual decisions.
Moreover, the choice they usually face includes only two candidates
with a realistic shot at winning; both of these candidates may be very
seriously suboptimal, and the voters may have to select the lesser of two
evils.
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Once they arrive in Congress, legislators regularly, and with no
sense of shame, make decisions in order to promote the interests of their
own district, or even of their largest campaign contributors, at the expense of the public good. Actual laws, including those that will impose
coercive sanctions on citizens, are written through a messy process of
log-rolling and horse-trading. The politicians are focused on getting reelected, or possibly on the immensely lucrative jobs as lobbyists they may
receive when they leave the Congress. Taking this system as a whole,
does it seem like a source of benevolent, disinterested, authoritative
guidance, free from any taint of irrationality? On the contrary, it seems
like we may fervently wish to be left alone to make our own mistakes,
rather than being subjected to coercive or deceptive control by such a
comprehensively flawed and irrational system.
Perhaps the only form of paternalism it would make sense to tolerate from such a political system would be what Sunstein and Thaler
have called “libertarian paternalism.” Here the state intervenes to
change the default option, thereby bringing about better social outcomes, but giving everyone the choice to do otherwise than what it suggests. So, for example, some people fail to sign up for IRA retirement
savings plans that are available at their work, out of laziness, confusion,
or weakness of will, thereby condemning themselves to a penurious old
age. But if they were signed up automatically, as the default option, few
would opt out. Government intervention to get their employer to change
from an opt-in system to an opt-out system would be an example of libertarian paternalism. In this way, if someone has an immensely important reason to maximize their income now—say, an inordinately
expensive but temporary medical crisis—that person could opt out of the
system. Thus libertarian paternalism does not involve coercion or deception, and does not limit our freedom. Even the politicians we have, operating in the political system we have, can probably be trusted with this
relatively weak but useful tool.
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The Lotus Sūtra’s ethics of benevolent paternalism was probably
never intended to apply to political leaders, except perhaps insofar as
those leaders are themselves advanced bodhisattvas. But if the ethical
views found therein are to have any relevance at all to practice, it must
turn out that spiritual teachers can sometimes practice deception as a
form of appropriate means. And perhaps it’s plausible that they are better equipped to do so than the people who run our government. Certainly there is no shortage of people who claim to be accomplished spiritual
masters but are actually charlatans and frauds. But those who are genuinely qualified to be Buddhist teachers must have some authentic experience of the way things really are, a form of experience that will
make them more predisposed than most to use whatever capacities they
have for the genuine, long-term benefit of those who accept their teachings.
It’s important to emphasize again that the idea that the teacher
can tell students what they need to hear at the time—which may not be
what is actually true—is accepted, in some form, very broadly in the
Buddhist world. Any tradition of interpretation that makes use of a distinction between teachings of provisional meaning (Skt. neyārtha, Tib.
drang don) and teachings of definitive meaning (Skt. nītārtha, Tib. nges
don) is thereby accepting that the Buddha does not tell everyone the
whole truth, and may make statements that do not reflect ultimate truth
but do help the listeners to move forward in their own spiritual journeys.
Now the Lotus Sūtra unambiguously regards this way of teaching
as appropriate not just for the Buddha himself but for other spiritual
teachers as well. Not only Buddhas, but also advanced bodhisattvas, are
described as using appropriate means. (Reeves Classic 24) And this view
about who can use paternalist deception is not restricted to the Lotus
Sūtra, but is widespread in the Indian Mahāyāna tradition. We see this,
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for example, in the often-repeated injunctions to teachers not to present
the doctrine of emptiness to those who are not ready to understand it.
So the Lotus Sūtra is simply presenting, in somewhat clearer, starker and
more extreme forms, a view to which Mahāyāna Buddhists are independently firmly committed.
Indeed, contemporary spiritual teachers from Asian traditions
have frequently made use of this form of teaching. A mild form of paternalist deception is illustrated in this charming story about the great Tibetan Buddhist lama, Kalu Rinpoche:
A Canadian woman, one of his first Western disciples, visited him
a few months before he passed away. He said, “Do you remember
that first time we met? I asked your age, then told you that you
had reached the ideal age and stage—neither too old, nor too
young—to practice Buddhism.”
The woman had been forty-something at the time. Now,
more than twenty years later, she replied, “Of course I remember!
That meeting changed my life.” She had let her career slide and
had eventually entered retreat, first a three-year retreat, then a
life devoted to contemplation and retreat that continues to this
day.
Rinpoche smiled a little impishly and said, “Well, right after you left, the next person who came to see me was a young
woman in her early twenties, and I told her exactly the same
thing!” (Zangpo 23)
A more serious, but still plausibly justified, example of this type occurred
when Kalu Rinpoche was approached by a beginning student who asked
to be taught the meditation practices of the Shangs pa bKa’ rgyud lineage. He told the student, falsely, that the lineage had died out and no
longer existed. If the student was not ready to receive these teachings,
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but could benefit from other teachings Kalu Rinpoche could give him,
then this seems like an acceptable example of appropriate means. That
same student later wrote,
Buddhists are very comfortable with the Buddha’s and his followers’ dedication to enlightenment above all else. For example, my
Canadian friend and I profited immensely from Kalu Rinpoche’s
concern for us, which was far more important to him than an
empty notion of honesty at all costs. (Zangpo 25-26)
Nevertheless, there is some reason to be wary of a view that allows teachers to deceive their students. To explain why, we might say
that since real human teachers of today are not fully awake, they still
have blind spots. And the trouble with your blind spots is precisely that
you can’t see them. If you give teachers permission to disregard otherwise binding moral rules—such as “don’t lie”—for the greater benefit of
others, you make it possible for them to promote the good much more
effectively. But you also risk the possibility that their blind spots might
turn out to coincide with the areas in which they’re being given the
power to break the rules. This scenario could lead to disaster; and as anyone familiar with the history of American Buddhism knows, this danger
is not merely hypothetical.
So the permission to engage in paternalist deception is a dangerous gift, both practically and morally. But we should not conclude that
there is safety in a complete prohibition of this type of deception. Suppose, for example, that emptiness is the way things are, but that those
who hear the teaching of emptiness before they are properly spiritually
prepared will have a tendency to misinterpret emptiness as nihilism and
therefore to abandon all moral discipline, becoming both monstrous and
miserable. These views seem to be central to much of Indian Mahāyāna.
If they are correct, then a norm to the effect that a teacher must always
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tell any student the whole truth about any subject would very likely be
more dangerous than the Lotus Sūtra’s ethic of paternalist deception.
It’s possible to agree that a qualified Buddhist teacher may tell
different students contradictory things for their own benefit without
accepting the stronger view that there are no rules at all that should
bind such a teacher. One might hold, for example, that although teachers
who are well on the way to awakening may lie to students, there is an
absolute prohibition on teachers having sex with students. Alternatively,
one might try to handle this very difficult and sensitive problem in a way
consistent with the “no rules” view. Thus it would be possible to argue
that although there is no exceptionless prohibition against sex between
teachers and students, a request by a teacher to a student for sex is so
unlikely to be a compassionate and helpful gesture, and so likely to be
the expression of a selfish agenda, that the making of such a request
should be seen by the student as prima facie evidence that this teacher
can’t be trusted with permission to break the rules. Paternalist deception, on the other hand, would not count as such evidence, although a
student could certainly regard instances of hypocrisy or obviously selfish deception as impeaching the teacher’s credibility.
I have argued that paternalist deception by teachers is a feature
of the Mahāyāna quite generally, but some would argue that it is not a
feature of Buddhism as such. In particular, Theravādins might argue that
the Lotus Sūtra’s views on upāya are a contingent, historical product of
the early Mahāyānists’ unwillingness to admit to being innovators. We
can hardly escape the conclusion that in the intellectual environment
the early Mahāyāna practitioners faced, they did not have the option of
claiming to be making progress—progress in ethical ideals, progress in
meditation techniques, progress in philosophical formulations. They
were forced to attribute deception to the historical Buddha precisely because they were forced to attribute their own, innovative teachings to
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him. Theravādins, on the other hand, can and do claim that during his
forty years of teaching, the historical Buddha never told a lie. So is their
lineage exempt from the charge of paternalist deception?
This issue depends crucially on how we interpret the concept of
conventional truth. It’s well known that, according to both the
Theravāda Abhidhamma and the Sanskrit Abhidharma traditions, statements about composite material objects and sentient beings are never
ultimately true, but only conventionally true. As I have argued at length
before, the most natural interpretation of this teaching, in the context of
these particular traditions, is that ultimate truth is just truth, whereas
conventional truth is something less—similar in some ways to fictional
truth, and in other ways to approximate truth (Goodman “Vaibhāṣika”).
If this interpretation is correct, then most of the Buddha’s teachings
were strictly and literally false. In the same way, a high school physics
instructor, when lecturing on Newtonian physics, mostly says things
that are strictly false—though they are highly useful, both pedagogically
and practically, and approximately true.
Some scholars reject this account of conventional truth in the
Abhidhamma traditions; so let’s assume I’m wrong about this issue, and
that for the Theravāda—as is the case for Madhyamaka—conventional
truth actually is a kind of truth. Then a Theravādin could defensibly
claim that the Buddha never used paternalist deception, in the strict
sense, since he never told a lie. On the other hand, the historical Buddha,
as he is presented in the Pāli Canon, was certainly willing to mislead students for their own good. He was therefore prepared to carry out a milder form of the same kind of teaching strategy.
To see this, let’s consider a well-known text from the Dīgha
Nikāya: namely, the Tevijja Sutta. This Theravādin scripture is famous for
its epistemological critique of monotheism. The young Brahmin
Vāseṭṭha asks the Buddha which of the Brahmin teachers of his day can
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guide him to his religious goal, union with the god Brahmā. But the
Buddha persuades him that none of these Brahmins is in any position to
know how to be united with Brahmā, since they have not seen that deity
and have no reliable evidence about him.
In this portion of the text, the Buddha’s arguments would be reasonably
familiar to someone like Richard Dawkins. But then, the dialogue takes
what, to many readers, is a completely unexpected turn. The Buddha
says:
“Vāseṭṭha, it might be said that such a man on being asked the
way might be confused or perplexed—but the Tathāgata, on being
asked about the Brahmā world and the way to get there, would
certainly not be confused or perplexed. For, Vāseṭṭha, I know
Brahmā and the world of Brahmā, and the path of practice whereby the world of Brahmā may be gained.”
At this Vāseṭṭha said: “Reverend Gotama, I have heard
them say: ‘The ascetic Gotama teaches the way to union with
Brahmā.’ It would be good if the Reverend Gotama were to teach
us the way to union with Brahmā, may the Reverend Gotama help
the people of Brahmā!” (Walshe 193)
The Buddha then instructs Vāseṭṭha that to reach the world of Brahmā, a
disciple must take ordination, keep moral discipline, develop meditative
stability up to the first jhāna, and then thoroughly practice the Four Divine Abidings (Pāli brahma-vihāra), which are lovingkindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity.
This passage does not portray the historical Buddha as a liar:
what he tells Vāseṭṭha is strictly and literally true. But Vāseṭṭha is being
seriously misled. He thinks he is hearing instructions about the final religious goal, about freedom from cyclic existence—as he puts it at the
beginning of the sutta, “the path of salvation that leads one who follows
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it to union with Brahmā” (Walshe 187)—where Brahmā is undoubtedly to
be understood as the supreme deity of the universe, in either a monotheist or a monist sense. But on the Buddha’s own view, that’s not what
Vāseṭṭha is getting. The Buddha sees himself as giving Vāseṭṭha instructions on how to be reborn as a god in a long-lasting, but impermanent,
heaven, a heaven that is squarely inside cyclic existence and in no sense
represents a liberation from it. The Buddha could have told Vāseṭṭha
this, but he didn’t; perhaps he had good reasons to believe that, given
the details of the young Brahmin’s current psychological state, by practicing with the goal of union with Brahmā, Vāseṭṭha would make more
progress than he would if he had been given a more accurate understanding of the nature of liberation in Buddhism. Or perhaps the Buddha
knew that by working with the grain of Vāseṭṭha’s worldview, rather
than against it, he had a better chance of persuading the young man to
engage in beneficial activities. On either understanding, the Buddha is
promoting Vāseṭṭha’s welfare by deliberately bringing it about that he
will have an incorrect understanding of the nature of the goal of his own
spiritual practice. This may not be paternalist deception in a strict sense,
but it’s certainly reasonably close.
This article has sketched a way of defending the paternalist views
of the Lotus Sūtra, which as we have seen, points clearly and accurately to
an uncomfortable, dangerous, but unavoidable normative feature of a
Buddhist worldview. The requirement for teachers to adjust their teachings to the needs, interests and degrees of spiritual development of their
various students, thereby opening themselves to the charge of dishonesty, is not an unfortunate innovation foisted on the Buddhist tradition by
the Lotus Sūtra. It is an inevitable feature of a religious system which
seeks to provide advanced students with guidance leading to a radical
cognitive and affective transformation, while also functioning as a
source of ethical values and moral discipline for large and populous so-
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cieties. From a Buddhist perspective, it’s hard to see how you avoid expecting the tradition to do both of those things.
I conclude that at least Mahāyāna Buddhists, and perhaps even
Buddhists generally, are unavoidably committed to endorsing a form of
weak paternalism; and given their understanding of human psychology,
their view has implications that some would classify as strong paternalism. They are not required to endorse, and probably should not endorse,
most forms of paternalist deception by political leaders, but only by certain advanced spiritual practitioners in their teaching activities. The
ideal of a teacher who is utterly uninhibited and ruthless in using whatever means are available to bring students to awakening as quickly as
possible can be both deeply appealing and deeply disturbing. But Buddhist practice is not about being comfortable. And there is no viable ethical objection to the conduct of such a teacher, always assuming that it
actually works as advertised. In a world scarred and wounded by the results of greed, hatred and delusion, we need all the awakening we can
get.9
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